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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
V • I 
DAVID J. HUNT, i 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
t Case No. 880386-CA 
t Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute for Value, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(1986)# in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber 
County. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the County Attorney's authorization of an 
application for an wiretap need not be a signed writing. 
2. Whether the Deputy County Attorney was duly 
authorized to apply for a wiretap extension order where the 
application stated he was "duly authorized?" 
3. Whether Utah Code Ann. SS 77-23a-7 and 77-23a-
10(10) (1982) mandate suppression of evidence obtained as a 
result of execution of a search warrant based upon information 
obtained from a telecommunicator intercept order, which order 
contained a technical defect? 
2. Whether defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and section 12, article I of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7. Evidence -
Exclusionary Rule. 
When any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication has been intercepted, no part 
of the contents of the communication and no 
evidence derived from it may be received in 
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding in or before any court, grand 
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory 
body, legislative committee, or other 
authority of the state, or a political 
subdivision of the state, if the disclosure 
of that information would be in violation of 
this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8. Court order to 
authorize or approve interception — 
Procedure. 
The attorney general of the state, or any 
assistant attorney general specifically 
designated by the attorney general or any 
county attorney or any deputy county attorney 
specially designated by the county attorney, 
may authorize an application to a judge of 
competent jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-10. 
(1) Each application for an order 
authorizing or approving the interception of 
a wire, electronic, or oral communication 
shall be made in writing upon oath or 
affirmation to a judge of competent 
jurisdiction, and shall state the applicant's 
authority to make the application. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10(5)a. 
(5)(a) An order entered under this chapter 
may not authorize or approve the interception 
of any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication for any period longer than is 
-2-
necessary to achieve the objective of the 
authorization, nor in any event longer than 
30 days. The 30 day period begins on the day 
the investigative or law enforcement officer 
first begins to conduct an interception under 
the order, or ten days after the order is 
entered, whichever is earlier. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(5)b. 
(b) Extensions of an order may be granted, 
but only upon application for an extension 
made under Subsection (1), and if the court 
makes the findings required by Subsection 
(2). The period of extension may be no 
longer than the authorizing judge deems 
necessary to achieve the purposes for which 
it was granted, but in not event for longer 
than 30 days. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(10)(a). 
(10)(a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, 
hearing, or proceeding in or before any 
court, department, officer, agency, 
regulatory body, or other authority of the 
United States, Utah, or a political 
subdivision, may move to suppress the 
contents of any intercepted wire, electronic, 
or oral communication, or evidence derived 
from any of them, on the grounds that: 
(i) the communication was unlawfully 
intercepted, 
(ii) the order of authorization or 
approval under which it was intercepted 
is insufficient on its face; or 
(iii) the interception was not made in 
conformity with the order of 
authorization or approval. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David J. Hunt, was charged with Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 
(1986). Defendant was convicted as charged after a bench trial 
held February 19-20, 1987, in the Second Judicial District Court, 
in and for Weber County, the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Roth on March 16, 
1987, to a term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 23, 1986, Don Hughes, the Weber County Attorney, 
filed an application for an order to intercept wire 
communications of defendant's residence. (See Br. of App. 
Addendum pages 11-14.) Attached to and incorporated into the 
application was an affidavit signed by Glen M. Warner, Sergeant 
of the Ogden City Police Department Narcotics Division, under 
oath and affirmation to John F. Wahlquist, a judge in the Second 
Judicial District. (See Brief of App. Addendum pages 15-42.) 
The affidavit named defendant as the main person involved in a 
drug organization that purchases and transports cocaine to 
various other suppliers along the Wasatch Front. (See Brief of 
App. Addendum page 27.) 
Judge Wahlquist signed an Ex-parte Order authorizing 
the interception of defendant's write communications from May 29, 
1986 to June 28, 1986. (See Br. of App. Addendum pages 43-48; T. 
36). At that time, the absence of Mr. Hughes' signature on the 
application was not noticed, though the unsigned writing was part 
of the file with Mr. Hughes' name repeated throughout. (See Br. 
of App. Addendum pages 11-14; T. 36.) 
On June 27, 1986, an application for an Ex-parte Order 
authorizing the Extension of the intercept was made by William F. 
Due to the volume of relevant documents, respondent will refer 
to the Addendum of the Brief of Appellant rather than duplicating 
the documents. 
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Daines, Deputy Weber County Attorney. (See Br. of App. Addendum 
pages 51-54.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-8 (1980), the 
application identified Mr. Daines as being "duly authorized" to 
make the application. (See Brief of App. Addendum page 51.) 
Attached to an incorporated into the application was an affidavit 
submitted by Sergeant Warner setting forth the results of the 
first intercept. (See Br. of App. Addendum pages 55-59.) 
Defendant, however, had left town for much of June, thereby 
negating much of the intercept period allowed in the first order. 
(See Br. of App. Addendum page 56; T. 42.) Consequently, Judge 
Wahlquist approved the extension of the intercept between June 
28, 1986 and July 27, 1986. (See Br. of App. Addendum page 62.) 
On July 26, 1986, Mr. Daines applied for another 
extension of the wiretap. (See Br. of App. Addendum page 69.) 
During preparation to apply for this final extension, it was 
learned that Mr. Hughes had failed to sign the original 
application for an intercept (T. 40). Thereafter, Mr. Hughes 
filed a Nunc Pro Tunc Order remedying the clerical defect. (See 
Br. of App. Addendum pages 49-50; T. 46.) The Nunc Pro Tunc 
Order corrected the oversight before the search of defendant's 
house and before his arrest (T. 37). Judge Wahlquist granted the 
extension of the intercept for seven more days operating from 
July 27, 1986 to August 3, 1986. (See Br. of App. Addendum page 
79.) The interception of defendant's wire communications ceased 
on August 3, 1986, in compliance with the Intercept Order (T. 32, 
45). A pen register, however, continued to operate on 
defendant's phone (T. 63). 
Based upon information accumulated by three Intercept 
Orders on defendant's phone, it appeared that a large drug 
transaction was about to occur between defendant a woman who 
lived in Vista, California. (See Br. of App. Addendum page 92.) 
On August 5, 1986, after calling the Vista number, defendant left 
suddenly for California (T. 64). Detectives Shorten and Cottom, 
who were on surveillance at the Vista residence, informed the 
Utah police that defendant arrived at the residence on August 6, 
1986 (T. 65, 144, 165). 
During defendant's stay in California, Brent West, 
Circuit Court Judge, received an affidavit in support of a search 
warrant based upon information obtained from the intercept on 
defendant's phone. (See Br. of App. Addendum pages 87, 91-94.) 
Finding probable cause to believe that defendant was involved in 
criminal activity, Judge West issued a search warrant for the 
defendant's home and automobiles. (See Br, of App. Addendum 
pages 86-94; T. 27.) 
On the night of August 8, 1986, defendant began driving 
back to Utah (T. 149-50, 170). Defendant was followed by four 
police cars and one helicopter (T. 234). Defendant arrived at 
his home in Utah on the morning of August 9, 1986 (T. 68). On or 
about August 9, 1986, the search warrant was executed on 
defendant'8 house and vehicles. (See Br. of App. Addendum pages 
88-89.) Thirty-four items of personal property were seized 
pursuant to the warrant including a pound of cocaine, set scales, 
scale weights, and a coke screen used to measure cocaine. (See 
Br. of App. Addendum pages 88-89.) Defendant was arrested and 
charged with Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute for 
Value (T. 255). 
On February 17, 1987, Mr. Don Sharp, counsel for 
defendant, filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a 
result of the search of defendant's home and vehicles (R. 39-40). 
The motion to suppress primarily challenged the sufficiency of 
the probable cause statements in support of the search warrant 
(R. 40). 
On February 19, 1987, trial was held before the 
Honorable David E. Roth, Judge of the Second Judicial District 
Court, sitting without a jury (R. 256). During trial, Mr. Sharp 
objected to the admission of any evidence obtained as a result of 
the Intercept Orders because Mr. Hughes had not signed the 
original order (T. 37). He also raised the issue of the validity 
of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order (T. 37). Judge Roth denied 
defendant's motion finding that the failure to timely sign the 
Application was not fatal to the warrant (T. 41). 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance with the Intent to Distribute for Value (T. 293). 
Defendant was sentenced to serve a term in the Utah State Prison 
of not less than one nor more than fifteen years (T. 156). On 
May 29, 1988, Don Hughes filed an affidavit establishing his 
authorization of the application for the intercept and his 
special designation of Mr. William Daines to authorize the 
extensions (R. 251-52). Defendant's direct appeal was dismissed 
on June 1, 1987 for failure to prosecute (R. 163). After a 
Habeas Corpus action in the Third Judicial District Court, the 
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matter was remitted back to Judge Roth for re-sentencing to allow 
defendant to pursue his right to appeal (R. 167-71). Defendant's 
Notice of Appeal was filed June 6, 1988, and he was released from 
the Utah State Prison following Judge Roth's approval of a 
Certificate of Probable Cause (R. 231, 233). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8 (1982) does not require the 
County Attorney's signature to authorize or specially designate a 
deputy county attorney to authorize an application for a wiretap. 
In any event, the wiretap application the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, 
and the County Attorney's Affidavit are establish that the 
wiretap application was in fact authorized by the County 
Attorney. 
The application for extension of the wiretap order 
specifically stated that the Deputy County Attorney was "duly 
authorized" to file the pleading. 
The Court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to the wiretap where the 
wiretap orders were properly authorized. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S AUTHORIZATION FOR A 
WIRETAP NEED NOT BE A SIGNED WRITING 
Defendant argues that the original order permitting 
interception of defendant's wire and oral communication was 
invalid because it was not properly authorized by the County 
Attorney. Defendant attributes the invalid authorization to the 
County Attorney's failure to sign the wiretap application. 
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Defendant's claim should be dismissed as it is without legal 
foundation. 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. SS 2510-2520, provides the framework from 
which the Utah Interception Communications Act, (hereinafter the 
Utah Act), Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-l (1982), et. seq. was based. 
The Utah Act, along with it federal counterpart, sets forth the 
procedure for obtaining judicial approval of the interception of 
wire communcations which aids in the investigation of specified 
serious offenses. Specifically, S 77-23a-8, of the Utah Act, 
governs county attorney applications for interception as follows: 
Any county attorney or any deputy county 
attorney specially designated by the county 
attorney, may authorize an application to 
Utah State district court judge of competent 
jurisdiction. . . 
On its face, this Utah statute does not require the 
authorization to be in writing or to be signed. Additionally, a 
scan of federal wiretap cases indicates that personal approval, 
not written approval, by the county attorney is all that is 
required to comply with the authorization requirement of Title 
III. 
For instance, in State v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974), 
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a wiretap issued 
pursuant to Title III where the statutory procedures of 
authorization had not been fully satisfied as required by the 
Title. Specifically, SS 2518(4)(a) and 2518(4)(d) of Title III 
were violated because the wiretap order xnisidentified the officer 
who had authorized the wiretap orders. Consequently, defendant 
_Q_ 
sought to suppress evidence that had been obtained under two 
wiretap orders alleging that a valid authorization for the 
wiretap orders had not occurred. Despite the procedural 
violation, the Supreme Court held that since the Attorney General 
had in fact authorized the application, a valid authorization had 
occurred and thus, Title III did not mandate suppression. The 
essence of the Court's holding was that proof of actual authority 
is all that is required to validate an authorization for an 
2 
application of a wiretap. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. 
Scully, 546 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 970 
(1976), thereafter considered a claim that a Title III 
authorization of an application for a wiretap mandated a signed 
writing. In its decision, the Ninth Circuit explained Chavez and 
decided the case contrary to the defendant's claim: 
Appellants contend that the application . 
. . was not properly approved by the Attorney 
General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 
2516(1), as required. In this case, there 
were documents demonstrating that the 
Attorney General personally approved of the . 
. . application, although he did not do so in 
writing. Under United States v. Chavez, 416 
U.S. 562, 94 S. Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 
(1974), personal approval is all that is 
required to comply with section 2516(1). The 
statute does not require a written approval. 
Scully, 546 F.2d at 261. 
In United States v. Thomas, 508 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 
1975), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975), the Eighth Circuit 
Consistent with its holding, the Chavez Court also excluded a 
wiretape because it had not been in fact authorized by the 
Attorney Geneal. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 754-55. 
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Court of Appeals held that the procedures followed by the Justice 
Department complied with the wiretap authorization requirements 
of Title III. In this case, the defendant challenged the 
authorization for a wiretap because the wiretap application was 
"signed by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General and not the 
Attorney General or his specially-designated Assistant Attorney 
General as required by U.S.C. S 2516. Ki. at 1202. In rejecting 
the defendant's claim, the Court reasoned that since there was 
independent proof that the Attorney General did in fact approve 
the application, a valid authorization had occurred. 
In United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 
1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 841 (1984), the First Circuit 
determined the validity of an authorization for a wiretap under 
Massachusetts law in light of Title III. In this case, the 
defendants questioned the sufficiency of the authorization for a 
wiretap because the district authority did not sign the 
application. The court determined "that the lack of such a 
document and the presumption it would enjoy is not to the 
government. The absence of a compelling signature can be 
remedied by proof of actual authority." Id* a t 859. 
In the case at bar, sufficient evidence existed to 
prove that Mr. Hughes actually authorized the intercept order. 
The original application named Mr. Hughes throughout as the 
seeking party. (See Br. of App. Addendum pages 11-14.) Inherent 
in the fact that Mr. Hughes personally filed the application, is 
- i i -
the idea that he must have also authorized it. 
The Nunc Pro Tunc Order also establishes that Mr. 
Hughes actually authorized the application (T. 37). The Nunc Pro 
Tunc Order not only satisfies evidentiary concerns, but is a 
judicially accepted method of correcting clerical errors or 
matters of form so that the record reflects actual orders or 
judgments rendered by the court. Its purpose is to "supply an 
omission in the record of something really done but omitted 
through mistake or inadvertence." Mora v. Martinez, 451 P.2d 992 
(N.M. 1969). In sum, the "[n]unc pro tunc procedure is an 
instrument of truth." Moore v. Mills, 623 S.W.2d 586, 588 
(Mo.App. 1981). 
However, it is not the function of a Nunc Pro Tunc 
Order to change or revise a judgment or order, or set aside a 
judgment actually rendered, or to render an order different from 
the one actually rendered. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. 
Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, 715 P.2d 477, 
478 (Okla. 1985). The Nunc Pro Tunc procedure is available to 
correct only clerical orders, not judicial errors, committed in 
the rendition of judgment. 
Defendant attempts to raise an ancillary issue that the 
evidence should be suppressed because the original application by 
Mr. Hughes was not made on "oath of affirmation" to a judge 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-10 (1986). This statute, 
like S 77-23a-8, and the previously cited case law, does not 
require the county attorney's signature. Moreover, paragraph 3 
of the first application incorporates by reference Sergeant Glen 
Warner's attached affidavit. (See Br. of App. Addendum page 11.) 
Sergeant Warner's affidavit follows all the requirement of S 77-
23a-10, including the requirement of an "oath and affirmation" to 
a judge. (See Br„ of App. Addendum pages 15-42.). The 
application is both facially and substantively valid. 
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Courts have held that the omission of a signature or 
the signing of the wrong document is a clerical error that can be 
remedied by a Nunc Pro Tunc Order. For example, in Schmidt v. 
Schmidt, 617 S.W.2d 601 (Mo.App. 1981), for example, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals found that the judge's "failure to sign a 
judgment is a clerical error which can be corrected through a 
Nunc Pro Tunc entry." Id. at 603. Similarly, in Petroleum 
Equipment Financial Corp. v* First National Bank, 622 S.W.2d 152 
(Tex.App. 1981), the Texas Court of Appeals allowed a Nunc Pro 
Tunc Order to remedy the judge's signing of an incorrect 
judgment. In reaching this decision, the court found that the 
signing of the incorrect judgment was a clerical error because it 
"involved no judicial reasoning." Ld. at 154. See also, 
Feltmann v. Coutler, 528 P.2d 821 (Ariz. 1974). 
In the case at bar, the omission of Don Hughes' 
signature is precisely the type of situation which a Nunc Pro 
Tunc Order is designed to remedy: a clerical error. In filing 
the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, Mr. Hughes did not attempt to alter or 
modify Judge Wahlquist's original judgment. In fact, the Nunc 
Pro Tunc Order did not disturb the initial wiretap order, it 
merely brought the court records into conformity with the truth. 
Defendant attempts to discount the Nunc Pro Tunc Order 
by citing to Utah State Building Board v. Wals Plumbing Co., 16 
Utah 2d 249, 399 P.2d 141 (1965), which quotes Kettner v. Snow, 
13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28, 29 (1962). In Kettner, a plaintiff 
failed to file within ten days of judgment a motion for a new 
trial as statutorily required. Sixty days after judgment, the 
trial judge allowed the plaintiff's motion for new trial and 
ordered it effective Nunc Pro Tunc as being within the first ten 
days of judgment. The Supreme Court of Utah disallowed the Nunc 
Pro Tunc Order reasoning that if the court could arbitrarily 
circumvent the 10-day limitation rule, "the rule would be 
rendered ineffectual." :id. at 30. 
Kettner is not analoguous to the case at bar. In the 
present case, Mr. Hughes did not attempt to remedy inaction 
through circumvention of statutory procedure. To the contrary, 
the Nunc Pro Tunc Order attempted to correct a clerical error in 
an already valid Intercept Order. Because S 77-23a-8 does not 
require the County Attorney's signature, no violation of express 
statutory procedure occurred. 
Furthermore, courts have traditionally allowed the 
introduction of independent evidence, such as affidavits, when 
the question of authorization is at issue. A scan of wiretap 
cases in state and federal courts indicates that this is a common 
method to determine who in fact authorized the application. This 
is allowed so that the Habsence of a compelling signature on a 
critical document can be remedied by proof of actual authority." 
Smith, 726 F.2d at 859. 
For example, the Scully court stated the following: 
Appellant Sanchez contends that the 
unsworn, unverified file memorandum of the 
Attorney General does not meet the 
government's burden of demonstrating 
approval. Cf. United States v. Chavez, 
supra. But the affidavit of Sol Lindenbaum, 
Assistant to the Attorney General, states 
that the Attorney General approved the 
application in a telephone conversation with 
him. This affidavit is sworn to and is 
sufficient. 
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Id. at 261. Similarly, the language of United States v. Lawson, 
545 F.2d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 1975) is compelling: 
Appellants have raised the question of 
whether wiretap authorizations signed by an 
acting Assistant Attorney General, not 
specifically authorized to approve electronic 
surveillance under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), must 
be suppressed as facially insufficient under 
18 U.S.C. S 2581(10)(a)(ii). See notes 2 and 
6 supra. 
We are not dealing with a claim that the 
wiretap application was not authorized by the 
Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney 
General because the defendants have not 
contested government affidavits indicating 
that Attorney General John Mitchell himself 
authorized the surveillance. Rather, the 
attack is on the facial sufficiency of the 
affidavit because the authorization order was 
signed by Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Henry Petersen. . . . 
(Emphasis in original.) The court in Lawson refused to suppress 
wiretap evidence based on the claim of facial sufficiency. 
Other examples of this procedure include United States 
v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 417 
U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Schullo, 363 F.Supp. 246, 253 
(D.Minn. 1973); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 222-23 (8th 
Cir. 1974); and United States v. Bowdach, 366 F.Supp. 1368 
(S.D.Fla. 1973). 
United States v. Giordono, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), 
provides the most dramatic example of the use of affidavits to 
determine who in fact authorized the wiretap application. In 
Giordano, the wiretap was facially valid in that the application 
indicated approval by a specially designated Assistant Attorney 
General. However, an affidavit submitted by the Executive 
Assistant to the Attorney General indicated that he, not the 
_ i « ; _ 
specially designated person, had authorized the application. 
Going behind the pleadings by use of affidavit, the Court 
determined that the approval was, in fact, by the wrong person 
and suppressed the evidence. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Hughes filed an affidavit as to 
the existence and extent of his involvement with the 
authorization of the application for the wiretap (R. 251-52). 
Specifically, the affidavit states that Mr. Hughes "personally 
authorized the initial application for interception on the phone 
in Hunt's house and caused a pleading to be created so 
indicating" and that the failure to sign the application was 
"[d]ue to an oversight" (R. 252). 
In light of the foregoing, there is ample evidence that 
the Mr. Hughes, the Weber County Attorney, personally authorized 
the initial wiretap on defendant's phone. Since proof of actual 
authority is all that is needed to validate the authorization, 
the absence of his signature and was not fatal to the 
application. 
Defendant next contends that the original order was 
facially invalid as it authorized interception for a longer 
period of time than is statutorily allowed. Defendant's 
contention simply misinterprets the language of the order. 
The first order, dated May 23, 1986 provides that: 
That this Order authorizing the 
interception of wire (telephonic) 
communications be executed as soon as 
practicable commencing on 5/29/86 at 0700 
hours and shall proceed until the objective 
is achieved. Said objective is specifically 
to include the identification of those 
persons as yet unidentified and/or known, who 
supply cocaine to David J. Hunt, and their 
co-conspirators. This Order authorizing the 
interception of wire (telephonic) upon the 
initial receipt of incriminating 
conversations but shall continue until enough 
evidence is obtained to accomplish the 
objectives herein states, but in no event 
shall the authorization to intercept 
communications extend longer than thirty (30) 
days past 0700 hours 6/28/86 unless a 
specific extension is granted by the Court 
upon a finding of the Court that this is a 
continuing criminal enterprise and that there 
is probable cause to believe that the 
communications sought to be intercepted will 
continue after the initial period of 
authorized interception. 
(See Br. of App. Addendum pages 45-46.) 
The interception was to commence at 7:00 a.m. on May 
29, 1986 and to terminate at 7:00 a.m. on June 28, 1986. (See 
Br. of App. Addendum page 45.) The order was not intended to 
continue, as defendant asserts, thirty (30) days following June 
28, 1986. Thus, Judge Wahlquist granted the wiretap for 30 days; 
the statutory maximum per § 77-23a-10(5)(a). Therefore, the 
wiretap order was facially valid and should not be voided. 
Similarly, extensions of wiretap orders are available 
under S 77-23a-10(5)(b) which provides: 
(b) Extensions of an order may be granted, 
but only upon application for an extension 
made under Subsection (1), and if the court 
makes the findings required by Subsection 
(2). The period of extension may be no 
longer than the authorizing judge deems 
necessary to achieve the purposes for which 
it was granted, but in not event for longer 
than 30 days. 
Judge Wahlguist approved the first extension which allowing the 
wiretap to continue from June 28, 1986 to July 27, 1986. (See 
Br. of App. Addendum page 62.) Again, this 30-day extension 
period meets statutory limits. Judge Wahlquist authorized the 
second extension to operate from July 27, 1986 to August 3, 1986. 
(See Br. of App. Addendum page 79.) The wiretap ceased on August 
3# 1986 (T. 32). As extensions are permissible under the Utah 
Actf and in view of the fact that the wiretap did not operate 
beyond the prescribed times set by Judge Wahlquist, the 
extensions are valid. 
POINT II 
THE DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY WAS DULY AUTHORZED 
TO APPLY FOR THE WIRETAP EXTENSION. 
Defendant contends that the first application for 
extension of the wiretap was void because it was made by a deputy 
county attorney not specially designated to authorize such an 
application. As defendant did not raise this claim in the trial 
court it is not properly before this court on appeal. 
"In the absence of exceptional circumstances, this 
court has long refused to review matters raised for the first 
time on appeal where no timely and proper objection was made in 
the trial court." State v. Loey 732 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987). 
See alsoy State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983). 
Specifically on point, the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 433 U.S. 910 
(1977), barred a defendant from asserting the claim of 
impermissible delegation of authority because the defendant 
•'failed to assert it in the pre-trial suppression hearing.H Id. 
at 527 n.4. See also, United States v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d 160, 
163 (2d. Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977). 
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In any event, as discussed in Point I, the issue is not 
what is written on the pleadings, but whether the deputy was in 
fact specially designated to approve the applications for wiretap 
extensions. The affidavit filed by Mr. Hughes clearly sets forth 
that Mr. Hughes "personally authorized the first application for 
extension dated June 27th, 1986" and that he "specially 
designated William F. Daines to review the evidence and pleadings 
and authorize this application" (R. 252). 
Moreover, statutes providing standards for issuance of 
wiretap orders are to be interpreted "in a practical common sense 
fashion to effectuate their purpose." People v. Ingram, 684 P.2d 
243 (Colo. 1984). The approval of application for wiretap 
extension dated June 27, 1986 indicates that the deputy was "a 
duly authorized deputy Weber county attorney." (See Br. of App. 
Addendum page 51.) In general pleadings, it is unnecessary for a 
deputy county attorney to use this language. A commonsense 
reading of the "duly authorized" language indicates that the 
deputy was authorized to do what he did, to-wit; apply for an 
extension. 
Defendant relies on United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 
505 (1974), which stands for the proposition that there is a 
limited class of people that may authorize an application. 
Accordingly, if the application is not authorized by those 
specified individuals, the evidence is suppressed. However, the 
Giordano decision is distinguishable from the case at bar in that 
in Giordano, the facts showed that neither the attorney general 
nor a specially designated assistant had in fact approved the 
application• Because the facts in this case demonstrate that Mr. 
Daines was jln fact specially designated, a valid authorization 
occurred. 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE 
SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED. 
Defendant demands that all evidence obtained from the 
wiretap be suppressed on the basis that the initial wiretap 
application and first extension not properly authorized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7 (1986) provides that the 
contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, and any 
derivative evidence, may not be used at a criminal trial, or in 
certain other proceedings, "if the disclosure of that information 
would be violative of this chapter." Under the Utah Act, 
aggrieved persons may move in a timely manner to suppress the use 
of such evidence at trial on the grounds that: 
(i) the communication was unlawfully 
intercepted; 
(ii) the order of authorization or approval 
under which it was intercepted is 
insufficient on its face; or 
(iii) the interception was not made in 
conformity with the order of authorization or 
approval. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10(10(a) (1986). 
Defendant demands suppression alleging that "the 
communication was unlawfully intercepted." Utah Code Ann. S 77-
23a-10(10(a)(i) (1986). 
Evidentally, defendant adopts the position that every 
violation of the Utah Act, whether major or minor# should be 
punished by suppression of the evidence obtained therefrom. 
However, in analyzing the federal counterpart to the Utah 
Interception of Communication Act, the Supreme Court opinions in 
Giordano and Chavez held that not "every failure to comply fully 
with any requirement provided in Title III would render the 
interception of wire or oral communications 'unlawful'". United 
States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 574-75. "To the contrary, 
suppression is required only for a 'failure to satisfy any of 
those statutory requirements that directly and substantially 
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of 
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the 
employment of this extraordinary investigation device.'" United 
States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433-34 (1977), quoting United 
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527. 
The Donovan case concerned 18 U.S.C. S 2518(1)(b)(iv), 
which requires the government to identify, in its application for 
a wiretap the person whose communication is to intercepted, and § 
2518(8)(d), which requires in part that the issuing judge give 
notice to the person whose communications were intercepted. 
Donovan and two others had received proper notice under 
S 2518(8)(d), but were not named in the application as required 
by (l)(b)(iv). Two other defendants were inadvertently not 
listed in the notice documents and thus were not given proper 
notice. Despite these violations, the Court refused to suppress 
the evidence for either violation and held that neither provision 
played a central role in the overall purpose of Title III. 
In People v. Wrestler, 458 N.E.2d 1348 (Ill.App. 1984), 
the Court held that where there has been a technical defect in an 
eavesdropping order, such a defect did not warrant the drastic 
remedy of suppression. In that case, the Judge inadvertently 
authorized wiretapping for a longer period of time than was 
statutorily allowed. In rejecting the suppression motion, the 
Court reasoned that the defect did "not defeat the legislative 
intent of protecting the citizenry from unnecessary and prolonged 
intrusion into their privates." Ici. at 1352. 
Although one could argue that an oral authorization 
amounts to no authorization at all, notwithstanding, Congress may 
have envisioned that the writing requirement would play "[n]o 
role more significant than a reporting function designed to 
establish on paper that one of the major procedural protections 
of . . . [Title III] been accomplished." United States v. 
Chavez, 416 U.S. at 579. 
In the case at bar, the omission of Mr. Hughes' 
signature was a technical error, which error did not defeat a 
central purpose of the Utah Act. Defendant urges, however, that 
because of Congress's announced concern over unjustified and 
excessive wiretapping, the procedural provision should be 
strictly construed to suppress all evidence even in the face of a 
minor procedural violation. Granting that Congress is interested 
in deterring substantive excesses, not inadvertent errors, the 
evidence should not be suppressed. 
It may be argued that written authorization is 
essential to the central purpose of the Utah Act. Yet, implicit 
in the caselaw interpreting wiretap legislation is the principle 
that violations of even central requirements do not mandate 
suppression if the Government demonstrates to the court's 
satisfaction that the statutory purpose has been achieved despite 
the violation. 
For example, in United States v> Johnson, 539 F.2d 181 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977), the court 
held that the Government's failure to comply with District of 
Columbia's inventory requirement, D.C. Code Ann. § 23-550, "is 
not grounds for suppression if the ends of that requirement have 
otherwise been achieved." Ld. at 194. Similarly, in United 
States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth 
Circuit has adopted a three-part test focussing on the central 
purpose of the statutory provision to whether its purpose has 
been attained. 
In United States v. Caggiano, 667 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 
1982), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while "the 
sealing requirement [of the wiretap tapes] is a central or 
functional safeguard to prevent abuses of the wiretap act," . . . 
"the technical noncompliance mandated suppression, however, only 
if the . . . purpose of the procedure has been frustrated or the 
procedure has been deliberately ignored." IcI. at 1179. See 
also, United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir. 1979), 
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980). 
In the case at bar, the central purpose of S 77-23a-8, 
the statute in question, is to "fix responsibility." United 
States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 216. By identifying the person 
who authorized the application, responsibility is Hcentralized in 
a publically responsible official subject to the political 
process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of 
electronic surveillance techniques." S. Rep. 1097, 90th 
Congress, 2nd Session, 96-97 (1968). 
Notwithstanding the absence of written authorization, 
the purpose of affixing public responsibility was met in this 
case. Responsibility was denoted in the original application 
which named Mr. Hughes as the public official seeking the 
application. (See Br. of App. Addendum pages 11-14.) 
Responsibility was also affixed by the Nunc Pro Tunc Order filed 
by Mr. Hughes which stated that Mr. Hughes "fully approved the 
application [for a wiretap] in its final form" (See Br. of App. 
4 
Addendum pages 49-50.) Finally, responsibility was affixed by 
the affidavit which clearly identified Mr. Hughes as "personally 
authorizing the initial application for interception on the phone 
in Hunt's house and caused a pleading to be created so 
indicating" (R. 252). 
Under these circumstances, both the overreaching 
purposes of § 77-23a-8(l) ensuring uniformity and political 
accountability and; (2) the more limited evidentiary function of 
the writing requirement were clearly satisfied. When there is no 
suggestion that the Government deliberately ignored S 77-23a-8, 
and where the statutes purposes have been fully satisfied, the 
suppression order should not be granted. 
Defendant again relies on Giordano which stressed that 
pre-application approval was essential to the central purpose of 
Title III. In Giordano, however, neither the Attorney General 
nor a specifically designated assistant in fact authorized the 
intercept orders. Thus, in order to comply with Title III, the 
4 
It should be noted that this Nunc Pro Tunc Order was signed by 
Mr. Hughes and filed before a search warrant was issued on 
defendant's house and before defendant was arrested. 
court reasoned that the Attorney General would have had to 
authorize an application "after the application is made and after 
investigative officials have already begun to intercept wire or 
oral communications under a court order predicated on the 
assumption that proper authorization to apply for intercept 
authority had been given.M 416 U.S. at n.12. The court's concern 
in Giordano does not apply to the present case in that the County 
Attorney did in fact authorize the application for the wiretap 
from the outset. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 
Defendant argues that defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel at trial because defense counsel failed to 
properly challenge issues that were critical to the defense. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel 
"it is the defendant's burden to show: (1) that this counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and 
(2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been 
different but for counsel's error." (Footnote omitted.) State 
v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 
1203-04 (Utah 1984), overruled on other grounds, 739 P.2d 628, 
631 (Utah 1987) (adopting Strickland test). Failure to show 
either deficient performance or resulting prejudice will defeat a 
claim of ineffective counsel. State v. Geary, 707 P.2d at 646. 
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The Utah Supreme Court most recently reiterated its 
adoption of the Strickland test in State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1987): 
Before this Court will consider whether 
specific conduct falls below the required 
standard of objective reasonableness, the 
person arguing ineffective assistance must 
show that the conduct prejudiced his case, 
fStrickland, 466 U.S.] at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 
2069; see also State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 
405 (Utah 1986). In order to prove prejudice 
to his case, "defendant must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 
S. Ct. at 1028. . . . 
Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023. 
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for the following reasons: (1) he failed to file a 
timely motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence; (2) he 
failed to object to the sufficiency of the probable cause 
statement in support of the search warrant; (3) he failed to 
object to the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the 
intercept order; and, (4) he failed to articulate and support his 
objection to certain evidence. 
As to the first two claims, defendant's claims are 
inconsistent with the facts. Trial counsel in fact filed a 
timely motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the 
search of defendant's home (T. 39). In the motion to suppress, 
trial counsel specifically raised the issue whether the probable 
cause statement was sufficient to support the search warrant (T. 
39). Defense counsel also challenged at length the sufficiency 
of probable cause statement (T. 277-84). 
As to the third claim dealing with trial counsel's 
failure to object to the sufficiency of the intercept order 
affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that: "[d]ecisions 
as to . • . what objections to make . . . are generally left to 
the professional judgment of counsel." State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). In State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 
1982) the Utah Supreme Court said, "[t]his Court will not second 
guess the strategy of counsel at trial." Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 
59. 
Regarding the last claim, defendant asserts that if 
trial counsel's objection to the admittance of evidence was 
supported by case law, the judge would have suppressed the 
evidence. Evidentally, defendant believes that but for the lack 
of supporting authority, the evidence would have been suppressed. 
Since Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-8 and applicable case law do not 
require written authorization, the failures now claimed by 
defendant were not legal failures. As argued above, defendant is 
not entitled to suppression of evidence on the grounds now raised 
on appeal. Thus, trial counsel could not have been ineffective 
for failing to raise the meritless issues now raised on appeal. 
Applying the facts of this case to the test set forth 
in Strickland and followed in Frame, trial counsel's 
representation did not fall below the objective standard of 
reasonableness guaranteed by the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. Defendant has failed to meet his burden of 
showing ineffectiveness of counsel and prejudice caused thereby. 
Therefore, this Court should find that defendant was afforded a 
fair trial with constitutionally sufficient representation of 
counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, respondent 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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